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ABSTRACT 
 
The Framing Effect and Breast Cancer Treatment Options:  
Do Individual Characteristics Play a Role? 
 
Kelly L. Schuller 
 
 
The effect of frame, or the way in which options are worded, has been shown to influence 
decisions in many domains; however, the literature lacks studies that examine the effect of age 
and other individual characteristics on susceptibility to the framing effect.  Sixty-eight college-
aged women (M age = 19.10 years, SD = 1.54) and sixty-six women over the age of 60 years (M 
age = 70.76 years, SD = 7.10) were presented with breast cancer vignettes that varied by frame 
(i.e., gains option worded in terms of number of women who would be cured and loss option 
worded in terms of number of women who would die) and degree of risk involved (i.e., risk 
averse versus risk seeking).  Tversky and Kaheman’s classic Asian disease design was adapted to 
create the breast cancer vignette. Participants rated the likelihood of choosing the risk-averse or 
the risk-seeking treatments.  The influence of individual characteristics (age, experience with 
breast cancer, cognitive ability, cognitive processing, sensation seeking, and need for cognition) 
on treatment decisions was examined.  When presented with the negative frame, older women 
made riskier decisions than did women presented with the positive frame.  Frame, however, did 
not influence younger women’s decisions.  Experience with breast cancer (personal and 
vicarious), crystallized and fluid intelligence (as assessed by the Kaufman Brief Intelligence 
Test), analytical versus heuristic cognitive processing (as assessed by the Rational Experiential 
Inventory), and sensation seeking (as assessed by the Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale) were 
not associated with treatment decisions.  Women lower in need for cognition made riskier 
decisions than did women higher in need for cognition, but that did not vary by frame. The age x 
frame interaction found using with the breast cancer vignette was also shown using general 
cancer and non-cancer vignettes.  This indicates the interaction of age and frame is generalizable 
to domains other than breast cancer.  Thus, the way in which options are worded influences older 
women’s decisions, which may influence outcomes, particularly in the domain of health. Results 
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The Framing Effect and Breast Cancer Treatment Options:  
Do Individual Characteristics Play a Role? 
Research that examines medical decision making indicates that the way in which a 
treatment option is framed (worded either positively or negatively) influences peoples’ choice of 
treatment (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; Rybash & Roodin, 1989; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981).  The degree to which frame impacts treatment decision may be influenced by 
individual difference characteristics.  One individual characteristic that may be important is age.  
Age has been shown to influence the ways in which individuals process information and reason 
(Klacyznski & Robinson, 2000); however, few studies examine the impact of age and frame on 
medical decision making.  Other individual characteristics, such as experience, cognitive ability, 
sensation seeking, need for cognition, and type of cognitive processing may also influence 
medical decision making.  The literature lacks empirical studies that examine how the way 
treatment options are framed in combination with individual characteristics influence the 
decisions that women make when dealing with breast cancer.  The current study adds to the 
literature by examining these variables as they relate to women’s decisions when presented with 
a vignette dealing with breast cancer.    
Women’s Health 
 The issue of women’s health has gained the attention of both policy makers and 
researchers.  According to the US Census (2003), fifty-one percent of the total US population is 
female; however, the proportions of the sexes vary by age.  There are more males than females in 
the younger age groups and consecutively more females than males with age.  Breast cancer is an 
important health concern that impacts both females and males; however, breast cancer is about 
100 times more likely to affect females (American Cancer Society, ACS, 2006).  Many women 
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will be influenced by breast cancer either personally or through someone they know.  According 
to the American Cancer Society, breast cancer is the most common form of cancer in women, 
following skin cancer. Over 2 million women in the United States have breast cancer.  Among 
women’s cancer-caused deaths, breast cancer ranks second only to lung cancer.  Approximately 
40,410 women will die from the disease in the year 2006.  Breast cancer strikes women of all 
ages and races; however, the chances of getting breast cancer increase with age.  At age 30 
women have a one in 2525 risk of getting breast cancer, by age 40 this increases to one in 217 
and one out of 24 by 60 years of age. The chance of a woman having breast cancer at some time 
during her lifetime is 1 in 7; the chance of a women dying from breast cancer is 1 in 33 (ACS).  
Breast Cancer Decision-Making 
 The literature that examines medical decision-making is expansive.  Research has 
examined decision making related to many different types of cancer, including prostate cancer 
(Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006), lung cancer (Sharf, Stelljes, & Gordon, 2005), cervical cancer 
(White, Wearing, & Hill, 1994), skin cancer (Rasmussen, 2005), and breast cancer (Meyer, 
Russo, & Talbot, 1995).  Women diagnosed with breast cancer face a variety of decisions, 
including which treatment options are best for them.  There are many treatment options available 
(www.breastcancer.org, 2006). Decisions must be made whether to choose conservative or 
radical treatment options.  Conservative treatment options include lumpectomy, whereas, radical 
treatment options include single or double mastectomy. In addition, chemotherapy, radiation 
therapy, or hormonal therapies are often part of the treatment regimen. Information about 
treatment options is often presented to patients by a physician or someone on the medical staff.  
In addition, women may be given literature on the treatment options available and what is 
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involved with each option.  Many factors, such as how the information is presented, may 
influence the decision-making process.   
Theories of Decision Making 
Decision making can be rational or irrational.  Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
Expected Utility Theory (1947) describes several axioms, or principles, for rational decision 
making.  One principle, invariance, states “the preference order between prospects should not 
depend on the manner in which they are described” (Kahneman & Tversky 1984).  Therefore, 
according to Expected Utility Theory, when making decisions, a rational individual’s choice 
should not be influenced by the way in which the options are worded or framed.  However, 
research indicates that the way in which a message is framed or worded in terms of either gains 
or losses influences peoples’ decisions (McNeil et al., 1982; Rybash & Roodin, 1989; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1979).  Tversky and Kahneman’s Prospect Theory describes conditions which 
induce individuals to make irrational choices.  According to Prospect Theory, people 
“overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes that are merely 
probable” (Tversky & Kahneman, p. 265).  People tend to be risk averse (i.e., choose the sure 
thing) when the problem is framed, or worded, positively in terms of gains, whereas people are 
risk seeking (i.e., choose the risky option) when the problem is framed, or worded, negatively in 
terms of losses.  
The Framing Effect 
In the classic framing effect study, Tversky and Kahneman (1979) presented participants 
with the hypothetical vignette below which described an ambiguous Asian disease.   
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is 
expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed.   
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) study, participants were asked to choose between 
treatment options.  Treatment options contained the same expected outcome in terms of risk; 
however, options were presented as either gain-framed or loss-framed.  In the gain-framed 
condition, the treatment options were described as the number of lives that would be saved; in 
the loss-framed condition, treatment options were described as the number of lives that would be 
lost.  The participants were asked to assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows:  
Gain-framed condition: 
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 
2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
Loss-framed condition: 
 If program A is adopted, 400 people will die. 
            If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die.   
 Tversky and Kahneman (1979) found that a framing effect occurred.  That is, although the 
outcomes of the positive gain-framed and negative loss-framed options are statistically 
equivalent, the way in which the options were worded affected the treatment decision.  In the 
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gain-framed condition, participants chose the less risky option or the “sure thing” (program A).  
In the loss-framed condition, participants chose the more risky option (program B).   
 The framing effect is a well established phenomenon that has been examined using 
different designs in multiple domains: the Asian disease design (the classic study design 
presented above), the gambling design, the tax evasion design, the clinical reasoning design, the 
bargaining design, the message compliance design, the escalation of commitment design, the 
evaluation of objects design, and the game-theory design (see Kuhberger, 1998 for review).  
Kuhberger conducted a meta-analysis of 136 empirical studies that used various designs to 
examine the framing effect.  Results of the meta-analysis showed that, in general, the effect of 
frame was small to moderate; however, the calculation of effect sizes was difficult because many 
of the studies did not report effect sizes.  Kuhberger also stated that there was a larger effect of 
frame when using the Asian disease design as compared to any of the other designs. In the 
current study, the classic Asian disease design was adapted for use with medical decisions about 
breast cancer. Thus, it was expected that there would be an effect of frame on treatment decision.  
Research shows that the way information is framed influences decisions in many 
different areas, including business decision making (Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 2004), gambling 
decisions (Loke & Tan, 1992), marketing research (Block & Keller, 1995; Olekalns & Frey, 
1994), and medical decision making (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). The influence of frame on 
medical decision making has consistently been shown in the literature and persists even when a 
single person is presented with both frames (Frisch, 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991).  In a study 
that examined the effect of frame on 133 women’s (ages 40 and older) decisions to undergo a 
preventative mammography, Banks and colleagues (1995) found that women were more likely to 
choose to undergo a mammography when presented with a video message that was negatively 
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framed (i.e., stressing the risks of not getting a mammography) as compared to women who were 
presented with a video message framed positively (i.e., stressing the benefits of getting a 
mammography).  Similarly, Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987) found that young adult women 
presented with a pamphlet that emphasized the risks of not performing self-breast exams (i.e., 
loss-framed information) reported that they would more likely to perform a self-breast 
examination as opposed to women presented with: (1) a pamphlet that emphasized the benefits of 
performing self-breast exams (i.e., gain-framed information), (2) a pamphlet that did not present 
either the benefits or risks, or (3) no pamphlet at all.  Malloy, Wigton, Meeske, and Tape (1992) 
examined the influence of frame on older adults’ decisions about medical intervention (i.e., life-
sustaining treatment).  Results showed that individuals presented with a negative description of 
the treatment (i.e., “machine that controls your breathing”, p. 145) were less likely to choose the 
intervention as compared individuals presented with a neutral frame (i.e., “breathing by 
machine”, p. 145), or positive frame (i.e., “device to help you breathe”, p.145).  Together, these 
results indicate that the way in which a medical decision is framed, particularly when framed 
negatively, or in terms of losses, influences choices to undergo preventative therapy and 
treatment. 
In the current study, the Asian disease design of Tversky and Kahneman (1979) was used 
to examine the framing effect in women’s medical decision making when dealing with breast 
cancer.  Positive frame was presented as the number of women who would be cured and the 
negative frame was presented as the number of women who would die.  Consistent with Prospect 
Theory, it was expected that women presented with the positive frame would be more likely to 
be risk-averse (i.e., more likely to choose the “sure thing”), whereas women presented with the 
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negative frame would be more likely to be “risk-taking” (i.e., more likely to choose the risky 
option).     
Processing: Analytical versus Heuristic 
 An important aspect to consider when examining the influence of frame on decision 
making is the different types of cognitive processing in which individuals engage.  Various terms 
have been applied to these types of processing: experiential and rational (Epstein, Lipson, 
Holstein, & Hub, 1992), systematic and heuristic (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), intuition and 
reasoning (Kahneman, 2003), and analytical and heuristic (Finucane, et al., 2002; Klaczynski & 
Robinson, 2000; Park, 1999; see Table 1).  The terms analytical and heuristic processing are used 
in this report because the terms are most common in the literature.   
Analytical processing involves “in-depth” mental processing, that is, “analytical 
processing is consciously controlled, effortful, and relies on abilities that are frequently believed 
to reflect cognitive maturity” (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000, p. 400; see Table 1).   Analytical 
processing is more likely to occur when the person is highly motivated or when the decision, or 
the consequence of the decision, is very important (Klaczynski & Robinson).   
In contrast, heuristic processing involves the use of mental shortcuts to make decisions 
quickly and often efficiently.  Heuristic processing involves less “in-depth” mental processing 
than does analytical processing, that is, heuristic system processing is preconscious, rapid, and 
effortless (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000, p. 400; see Table 1).  Heuristic processing is more 
likely to occur when the decision is not very important or when the person is not able or 
motivated to invest cognitive energy to the decision-making process (Finucane, et. al., 2002), or 
when the person is an expert in the area of the decision (Johnson, 1981). The role of expertise in 
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understanding the decision-making process is developed in greater detail in the cognitive 
processing and experience/expertise section.   
Dual or Single Framework of Cognitive Processing 
 In the literature described above, cognitive processing is viewed as two distinct systems 
(i.e., analytical versus heuristic).  This is known as the dual processes, or “dualist” approach 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Hub, 1992; Finucane, et al., 2002; 
Kahneman, 2003). The dual process approach describes processing as two independent but 
interactive systems.  One system, heuristic processing, is based on intuition and is implicit (i.e., 
without awareness), whereas, the other system, analytical processing, is based on logical 
reasoning and is explicit (i.e., deliberate and with awareness).  Another approach views cognitive 
processing as a single framework (Hammond, 1996; Oberauer, 2000; Osman, 2004).  According 
to the single framework approach, cognitive processing moves along a continuum, with heuristic 
reasoning at one end and analytical reasoning at the other.  Although recent literature emphasizes 
the dual process approach, Hammond argues that a single framework approach is advantageous 
because it “accommodates a broader range of processing within a single-system framework” 
(Osman, p. 993).  The current study examines cognitive processing as both a single framework 
(i.e., overall cognitive processing denoted “cognitive processing”) and as dual processes (i.e., 
analytical processing, denoted “need for cognition”, and heuristic processing, denoted “faith in 
intuition”). 
Cognitive Processing as an Individual Characteristic or Situational Variable 
 In addition to viewing cognitive processing as a continuum or dual processes, cognitive 
processing can be viewed as either an individual characteristic that is stable across time or a 
variable that depends on the situation.  For example, an individual’s tendency, or need, to engage 
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in effortful thinking (i.e., analytical processing) is referred to as an individual’s need for 
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  In general, this is often described as a personality trait that 
is fairly stable across time.  In contrast, literature from social psychologists who conduct research 
on persuasion view cognitive processing, or the use of analytical versus heuristic reasoning as 
dependent upon the situation (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  For example, if an 
individual is motivated, he or she may engage in analytical processing.  However, if the 
individual is not motivated, he or she may engage in heuristic processing.    
Cognitive Processing and Frame 
The influence of the way in which a message is worded, or framed, and the type of 
processing in which an individual engages could work together to impact decision making in 
various ways.  According to Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990), the effects of framing on 
message persuasiveness can be explained by Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) Heuristic-Systematic 
Model (HSM).   According to HSM, negatively framed information is “non-normative”, and 
therefore not as expected as positively framed information.  Thus, when an individual engages in 
analytical processing, negatively framed messages should be more persuasive than positively 
framed messages.  Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy argue that individuals more readily accept 
positively worded versus negatively worded information, therefore, when an individual engages 
in heuristic processing, positively framed messages should be more persuasive than negatively 
framed messages.  According to Kahneman (2003), when individuals engage in analytical 
processing and are presented with both frames, they are more likely to recognize the 
relationships between framed options and answer consistently for both positively and negatively 
framed options.  Thus, when individuals engage in analytical processing, the frame of the 
message should not impact the decision.  In contrast, the frame, or way in which treatment 
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options are presented, could influence decisions when an individual relies on heuristic 
processing.  Thus, in the current study, individuals who rely on heuristic processing (i.e., those 
with high faith in intuition) may be influenced by the framing of the treatment options whereas 
individuals who rely on analytical processing (i.e., those with high need for cognition) may not 
be influenced by frame.   
Mediator and Moderator Models 
 Individual characteristics, such as those described below, may function as mediator or 
moderator variables.  A mediator variable is a variable that accounts for, or explains the 
mechanism by which a relationship between a predictor and a criterion variable occurs 
(Holmbeck, 1997).  In order for a variable to function as a mediator it must meet the following 
criteria: “a) variations in levels of the independent variable significantly account for variations in 
the presumed mediator (see Path a in Figure 1), b) variations in the mediator significantly 
account for variations in the dependent variable (see Path b in Figure 1), and c) when Paths a and 
b (see Figure 1) are controlled, a previously significant relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables is no longer significant, or decreases (as indicated by the standardized B 
weights; see Path c in Figure 1)” (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176).   
A moderator is a variable that influences that strength or direction of the relationship 
between a predictor variable and a criterion variable (Baron& Kenny).  In order for a variable to 
function as a moderator it must meet the following criteria: a) the predictor must be significantly 
related to the criterion variable (see Path a in Figure 2), b) the moderator must be significantly 
related to the criterion variable (see Path b in Figure 2), and c) the predictor x moderator 
interaction must be significantly related to the criterion variable (see Path c in Figure 2).   
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Everyday Problem Solving and Decision Making 
 The everyday problem-solving literature that addresses how individual difference 
characteristics influence the problem-solving process may provide insight on the factors that 
influence decision making.   There is a large amount of research that examines everyday problem 
solving (see Thorton & Dumke, 2005 for review).  Problem solving can be viewed as part of the 
decision-making process.  Problem solving involves the presentation of a problem and the 
generation of various strategies to solve that problem.  Decision making can be viewed as the 
final product of problem solving in that it involves evaluating the possible strategies or options 
and selecting one to use (Finucane, et al., 2002).  In a meta-analysis of age differences in 
everyday problem solving and decision making, Thorton and Dumke (2005) found that outcomes 
in the everyday problem-solving literature were not significantly different from those in the 
decision-making literature.  Thus, one can draw information from the everyday problem-solving 
literature when examining the decision-making process.   
Individual Characteristics 
Age 
Age differences in processing. Age has been shown to influence everyday problem 
solving and decision making.  A recent meta-analysis that examined age differences in everyday 
problem solving and decision making from laboratory studies showed that older adults had 
poorer everyday problem-solving/decision-making effectiveness than did young adults and 
middle-aged adults (Thorton & Dumke, 2005).  In addition, laboratory studies indicate older 
adults tend to seek out and use less information when solving problems and making decisions 
than do younger adults (Berg, Johnson, Meegan, & Strough, 2003; Berg, Meegan, & Klaczynski, 
1999; Johnson, 1990; Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995). In an everyday decision-making task, 
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Johnson (1993) found that older adults sought out less information and spent more time 
reviewing that information than did younger adults.  Berg, Johnson, Meegan, and Strough used 
the same everyday decision-making task as did Johnson to examine collaborative everyday 
problem solving and also found that older adults took more time to make a decision than did 
younger adults.  Cheng and Strough (2004) examined individual and collaborative problem 
solving and also showed that older adults took more time to complete the task than did younger 
adults.   
Time to make decisions with the decision-making task used by Johnson (1993) and Berg 
and colleagues (2003) was measured in seconds.  The difference in the time taken by older and 
younger adults in the problem-solving task by Cheng and Strough (2004) was approximately 11 
minutes (see p.181).  It is difficult to state that mere seconds or minutes actually influence 
decision making in a real-world decision-making situation, such as dealing with breast cancer.  
However, Meyer and colleagues (1995) examined age differences in decisions about breast 
cancer treatment with women who were actually diagnosed with breast cancer and found that 
older women sought out less information and took less time (measured in days) to make the 
decision than did younger adults.  Laboratory studies suggest older adults take more time to 
make decisions than do younger adults (in terms of seconds or minutes).  Real-world studies 
suggest older adults take less time to make decisions than do younger adults (in terms of days).  
With age, individuals may be more likely to use heuristic processing as opposed to 
analytical processing, which could influence the way in which framing of information affects 
decisions.  In this respect age differences may be a marker variable for the type of cognitive 
processing used. Thus, age differences in decisions may be mediated by type of cognitive 
processing (i.e., analytical or heuristic).  
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Research also suggests that older adults process positive and negative information 
differently than do younger adults.  Recent work by Carstensen and her colleagues (Lockenhoff 
& Carstensen, 2004) suggests that older adults process positive information to a greater extent 
than do younger adults.  When asked to choose between different health plans older adults spent 
more time reviewing the positive features of the plans; younger adults spent more time reviewing 
the negative features of the plans (Lockenhoff & Carstensen).   According to Maheswaran and 
Meyers-Levy’s (1990) application of the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) 
to message framing, this could indicate that younger adults use a more analytical processing 
approach and focus on the negatives, whereas, older adults use a more heuristic processing 
approach and focus on the positives.  Kahneman (2003) suggests that individuals who engage in 
heuristic processing are more influenced by the way in which a message is framed, or worded; 
therefore, perhaps older women will be more influenced by the frame than will younger women. 
      One explanation for differences in the type of cognitive processing used with age is that 
heuristic processing uses less cognitive energy than analytical processing, which may 
compensate for age-related declines in cognitive capacity.  According to the model of Selective 
Optimization with Compensation (Baltes & Baltes, 1990), throughout the life span there are 
gains and losses in both cognitive and physical ability; however, with age, there tends to be more 
losses than gains.    It is argued that declines in fluid intelligence, particularly working memory 
(Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) lead to poorer decision making (i.e., seeking out less information, 
or taking longer) in older adults as compared to younger adults.  Another explanation may be 
that individuals with a large amount of experience or expertise in an area may be more likely to 
engage in heuristic processing (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995).  However, the literature is inconsistent 
as to whether age differences in the decision-making process influence the quality of decisions.  
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Real-world studies, such as that of Meyer, Russo and Talbot (1995), suggest the quality of older 
adults’ decisions is about the same as that of younger adults (Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995).   
Thorton and Dumke’s (2004) meta-analysis of laboratory studies suggests age-related declines in 
the quality of decisions.  Therefore, it is not clear whether differences in processing of 
information with age necessarily translate to differences in the quality of outcomes, particularly 
when dealing with real-world situations. 
Age and frame. Little research has examined how age and message frame influence 
medical decision making.  Kuberger (1998) reviewed the research that examined the effect of 
frame to date and concluded that age may be an individual characteristic that would influence the 
effect of frame.  Kuberger conducted the meta-analysis in 1998, since that time very little 
research has examined the influence of age on the framing effect.  Mayhorn, Fisk, and Whittle 
(2002) examined the influence of age on medical and financial decisions and suggested that there 
are minimal age differences.  McKee (2001) examined medical decision making and found that 
younger adults may be slightly more influenced by the frame than are older adults.  However, 
this trend was not significant, and is inconsistent with what is suggested by research that 
examines age differences in cognitive processing.  Inconsistencies in the literature on the effect 
of age and frame on decisions support the need for studies that examine the interactions between 
age and the manner in which information is framed.  As suggested by the cognitive processing 
literature, perhaps older adults will be more likely to use heuristic processing than will younger 
adults.  Thus, older adults may be more influenced by the framing of the treatment options than 
will younger adults.   
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Age and cognitive ability. Another individual characteristic that is potentially important 
to examine is an individual’s cognitive ability.  Potential age variations in cognitive processing 
(i.e., analytical versus heuristic) have been explained by differences in cognitive capacity (Yates 
& Patalano, 1999).  That is, it is argued that older adults may use heuristic processing to a greater 
extent than do younger adults in order to compensate for age-related cognitive decline (Finucane 
et. al. 2002).  It is assumed that older adults suffer from declines in fluid intelligence; therefore, 
decreasing their cognitive capacity, which may lead to a greater reliance on heuristics rather than 
analytical processing.  Thus older adults may be more likely to be influenced by the frame of the 
treatment options.  A measure of cognitive abilities that assesses fluid and crystallized 
intelligence separately is needed in order to test this claim. In addition, working memory has 
often been linked to cognitive ability (Engle, 2002); however, recent literature emphasizes the 
notion that working memory and intelligence are different constructs (Ackerman, Beier, & 
Boyle, 2000).  Therefore, a separate measure of working memory may also help to understand 
potential age differences in the susceptibility of frame.   
Experience 
Research suggests that experience influences decision making. Meyer, Russo, and Talbot 
(1995) found that previous knowledge about breast cancer and treatment for breast cancer 
affected whether women chose lumpectomy, mastectomy, or radiation therapy.  Also, women 
mentioned experience with breast cancer when asked to provide a rationale for whether they 
made an immediate or delayed treatment decision.  Zwahr (1994) examined the effect of 
previous knowledge on women’s decisions about estrogen replacement therapy and found that 
previous knowledge influenced the number of treatments they felt would alleviate symptoms, 
and the number of times they compared various treatment options.  In an examination of older 
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adults’ endorsement of interpersonal and individual health problem solving strategies, Snyder 
(2004) found that experience impacted the ratings of problem solving strategies when dealing 
with both heart and arthritis problems.   Pierce (1993) suggests that when making medical 
decisions individuals remember their own and others experiences with the problems. Therefore, 
although few young adult women personally experience breast cancer, experience through 
another person (vicarious experience) may also impact decisions.  Patrick and Strough (2004) 
found that personal and vicarious experience combined was related to the number of strategies 
generated for solving everyday problems dealing with relocation; adults with experience 
generated more strategies than those without experience.  Together, this research suggests that 
both personal and vicarious experience (i.e., experience through another person) with breast 
cancer may impact the decision for treatment options.   
Cognitive Processing and Experience/Expertise 
Experience may also influence the type of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical versus 
heuristic) a persons uses to make decisions.  Increased experience may lead to a greater reliance 
on heuristic processing.  According to Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), which has 
been used to explain the framing effect, decision making involves both verbatim and gist mental 
representations; however people tend to rely on gist representations.  In addition, “intuitive gist-
based processing supplants analytical verbatim-based processing as people gain experience or 
novices become experts” (p. 66; Reyna, 2004).  There is a large literature that examines decision 
making by experts in various domains, including gambling (Loke & Tan, 1992), law (Johnson, 
Johnson & Little, 1984), physics, (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981), and medical decision making 
(Johnson, 1981). In a study that examined expert cardiologists and less expert physicians’ 
decisions to admit a patient suffering from chest pains, results indicated that expert cardiologists 
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relied more on heuristic processing than on analytical processing.  Expert cardiologists used less 
information to make a decision than did the less expert physicians; expert cardiologists 
considered only whether a heart attack was imminent or not.  If individuals with experience rely 
on heuristic processing, the frame of the option may influence choice.  However, it can also be 
argued that experience with breast cancer may increase motivation, which is generally associated 
with analytical processing (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  If individuals with experience are more 
motivated than those without experience to engage in analytical processing, the frame of the 
option may not influence choice. Experience may influence motivation or the type of cognitive 
processing used which, in turn, could influence the susceptibility of framing effects.  Therefore, 
experience may moderate the relationship between frame and decision.   
Sensation Seeking 
 An individual’s general risk-taking propensity may also impact decisions that involve 
risk.  Sensation seeking can be defined as a personality trait that involves a person’s desire for 
novel and intense sensory stimulation (Arnett, 1998; Zuckerman, 1994).  Sensation seeking has 
been linked to various risky behaviors, including erratic driving, promiscuous sexual behavior, 
and drug abuse (see Zuckerman, 1994 for review).  Arnett (1998) examined risky behavior in 
adults aged 20-28 years and found sensation seeking to be positively associated with risky 
driving, substance abuse, and risky sexual behavior.  In addition, Rolison and Scherman (2002, 
2003) found that sensation seeking was positively related to both adolescents’ and young adults’ 
risky behaviors respectively.  Examination of age differences in risky behaviors is scarce and 
inconsistent (Yates & Patalano, 1999).  Although sensation seeking has consistently been shown 
to be related to various risky behaviors, the influence of sensation seeking on medical decisions 
has not been examined.  It can be argued that an individual who is more likely to take risks in 
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general may be more likely to choose the risk-seeking option regardless of the way in which it is 
framed.  Conversely, an individual who is less likely to take risks may be more likely to choose 
the risk-averse option regardless of the way in which it is framed.  Thus, the wording, or frame, 
of treatment options may not influence treatment decisions for women who score extremely high 
(risk takers) or extremely low (risk avoiders) on sensation seeking.  Thus, sensation seeking may 
moderate the relation between frame and decision.   
Analytical Processing and Need for Cognition 
 Given the information presented above on cognitive processing, the type of cognitive 
processing (analytical or heuristic) may impact the influence of frame.   Therefore, another 
variable that needs to be examined is individual use of analytical versus heuristic processing.  As 
suggested by Kahneman (2003), an individual who generally uses analytical processing may not 
be influenced by the frame whereas, an individual who generally relies upon heuristics when 
making decisions may be influenced by the frame.  Thus cognitive processing type (analytical 
versus heuristic) may mediate the relationship between frame and decisions.  
An individual’s tendency, or need, to engage in effortful thinking (i.e., analytical 
processing) is referred to as an individual’s need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  Need 
for cognition has been shown to be negatively associated with susceptibility of framing effects 
(Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000; Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004; Smith & Levin, 
1998).  Smith and Levin examined an individual’s need for cognition and message frame on 
monetary tasks and medical decision making using a format consistent with the Asian disease 
design.  Results of the study indicated that for both types of tasks, framing effects emerged only 
for participants low in need for cognition, or low in analytical processing.  Similarly, Simon and 
colleagues found that the framing effect was more pronounced in individuals with a low need for 
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cognition.  Perhaps frame will influence treatment decision in women with a low need for 
cognition to a greater extent than it will for women high in need for cognition.  Therefore, need 
for cognition may moderate the relationship between frame and decisions. 
Statement of the Problem 
The issue of women’s health has increasingly gained the attention of physicians, 
researchers, and policy makers.  Females comprise the majority of the U.S. population, and there 
are many more females than males in older adulthood (US Census, 2003).  Breast cancer is a 
common form of cancer in women (ACS, 2005).  Individual characteristics, such as age, and 
other variables in combination with how information is framed, may influence the decisions that 
women make when presented with treatment options about breast cancer.  Understanding the 
decision-making process is very important for both medical service providers and women who 
may be faced with decisions about treatments for breast cancer.  Research on medical decision 
making indicates that the way in which a treatment option is framed or worded in terms of either 
gains or losses influences peoples’ decisions on treatment (McNeil et al., 1982; Rybash & 
Roodin, 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979), that is, a framing effect appears.  Although the 
framing effect in decision making has been reliably shown in many different areas, little research 
examines how frame in combination with age, influence medical decisions.  In order to gain a 
better understanding of the process involved in medical decision making, new research must 
examine the various factors may impact choice of treatment.  For example, do individual 
characteristics, such as cognitive ability, cognitive processing type (i.e., analytical versus 
heuristic), need for cognition, sensation seeking and experience with the problem mediate or 
moderate the effects of age and frame on medical decisions?  The current study was designed to 
contribute to the literature by examining the individual and interactive effects of individual 
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characteristics on women’s susceptibility to the framing effect when presented with treatment 
decision vignettes about breast cancer.  
Design 
The main subject variables was age (younger adult or older adult), and the main 
independent variable was frame (treatment options presented either positively or negatively).  
Additional subject variables were cognitive ability, analytical processing versus heuristic 
processing, need for cognition, experience, and sensation seeking. Frame (positive and negative) 
was counterbalanced and presented as a within-subjects variable in 3 domains.  The domains 
were breast cancer, general cancer, and non-cancer.  The general cancer and non-cancer domains 
were presented to examine the generalizability of the findings. In the primary analyses, frame 
was analyzed as a between-subjects variable for the breast cancer domain only.  The other 
subject variables (individual difference variables) were between-subjects variables.  The 
dependent variable was treatment decision (i.e., the degree of likelihood of choosing a risk-
seeking versus risk-averse treatment option).  The dependent variable was a continuous variable.  
Research Questions 
1) How do age and framing of the message (positive or negative) affect women’s choice of 
treatment options for breast cancer? 
2) Does type of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical versus heuristic) mediate age 
differences in treatment decision? 
3) Do individual characteristics such as cognitive ability, need for cognition, experience, 
and sensation seeking moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision? 
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Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
Frame  
1) The influence of message frame on health decision making has consistently been shown 
in the literature (Frisch, 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991).  It was hypothesized that the 
frame, or way in which treatment options were worded, would impact treatment decision 
in the same way as that found in the classic framing study (Tversky &Kahneman, 1979).  
When the treatment option was framed positively in terms of number of women cured, 
people would choose a more risk-averse option. When the treatment option was framed 
negatively in terms of number of women who would die, people would choose a more 
risk-seeking option. 
Age x Frame 
2) Research suggests that older adults may be more likely than younger adults to engage in 
heuristic processing (Park, 1999).  Heuristic processing involves the use of mental 
shortcuts, which may make individuals more susceptible to the framing effect. Therefore, 
it was hypothesized that there would be a significant frame x age interaction; frame 
would have more of an effect on older women than on younger women.   
Research Question 2 
Type of Cognitive Processing 
3) Research indicates that the type of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical versus heuristic) 
may be associated with susceptibility to framing effects (Kahneman, 2003).  It was 
hypothesized that women who relied on heuristic processing would be influenced by the 
way in which a message is framed whereas women who relied on analytical processing 
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would not be influenced by frame.  Thus, preferred cognitive processing type (i.e., 
analytical versus heuristic) was expected to mediate the relationship between frame and 
decision.  
Research Question 3 
Cognitive Ability 
4) Individuals with lower cognitive ability may be more likely to use heuristic processing; 
therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with lower cognitive ability scores would 
be influenced more by the frame than would individuals who scored higher on cognitive 
ability.  Thus, cognitive ability was expected to moderate the relationship between frame 
and decision. 
Experience 
5) Reyna (2004) suggests that heuristic processing overrides analytical processing as 
individuals gain experience.  It was hypothesized that frame would influence women with 
experience with breast cancer more than women with no experience of breast cancer; 
thus, experience was expected to moderate the effect of frame on decision. 
Sensation Seeking 
6) Sensation seeking has been linked to various risky behaviors, including erratic driving, 
promiscuous sexual behavior, and drug abuse (see Zuckerman, 1994 for review).  
Therefore, it was hypothesized that the wording, or frame, of treatment options would not 
influence treatment decisions for women who scored extremely high (risk takers) or 
extremely low (risk avoiders) on sensation seeking.  Thus, sensation seeking was 
expected to moderate the effect of frame on decisions. 
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Need for Cognition 
       7)  Greater need for cognition has been shown to be negatively associated with susceptibility 
to the framing effect (Chatterjee, Heath, Milberg, & France, 2000; Simon et al., 2004; 
Smith & Levin, 1998).  Therefore, it was hypothesized that frame would influence 
treatment decisions in women with a low need for cognition to a greater extent than it 
would for women high in need for cognition.  Thus, need for cognition was expected to 
moderate the relationship between frame and decision. 
Participants 
Using the Sample Power statistical program, a power analysis for a 2 x 2 interaction 
showed that 132 women were needed to detect medium effect sizes (> .25) with 81% power.  A 
power analysis for a regression with two variables and an interaction yielded sufficient power 
(power > .90) to detect medium effect sizes (> .25).  
The sample consisted of sixty-eight young adult women (M age = 19.10 years, SD = 
1.54) who were college students and sixty-six community-dwelling women aged sixty years and 
older (M age = 70.76 years, SD = 7.10).  All of the younger women were single; for older 
women, 43.9% were married, 37.9% were widowed, 13.6% were divorced, 1.5% was never 
married, and 3% were living as married.  The sample was 94.8% Caucasian. There were 2 
African American older women, 4 Asian younger women, and 1 younger woman reported as 
other.   
The college students were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes and 
recruitment flyers posted around the campus of West Virginia University.  College students 
received extra credit in undergraduate psychology courses as a thank you for participation. The 
older adults were recruited from senior centers, community facilities, and residential institutions, 
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and through personal contacts and recruitment flyers posted in the community.  Participants were 
also recruited from the sample used for a National Institute of Health grant-funded study (R03; 
OMB No. 0925-0001; Collaborative Everyday Problem-Solving: Gain or Loss, J. Strough 
primary investigator). A total of 56.7% of the current sample participated in the grant-funded 
study prior to participating in the current study.  Both younger women (N= 17; 39.7%) and older 
women (N= 49; 74.2%) were recruited from the grant-funded study.  Immediately after the 
participants completed the grant-funded study they were invited to participate in the current 
study at that time, and if they agreed, they completed the current study.  If they could not 
complete the current study at that time, they were asked if they would like to participate in future 
studies.  Each person who agreed to be considered for a future study filled out an information 
sheet with their contact information.  The time between participation in the grant-funded study 
and the current study varied from about 2 months for older women and 3 weeks for younger 
women.  Older adult participants were given $20.00 each as a “thank you” for participation in the 
grant-funded study.  Younger adult participants were given the choice of extra credit or $20.00 
each as a “thank you” for participation in the grant-funded study.  With the exception of income, 
women who participated in the grant-funded study were not significantly different from women 
who did not participate in the grant-funded study (see Table 2 and Table 3).  In addition, the 
women who did participate in the grant-funded study (M = 3.74, SD = .21) did not make 
significantly different treatment decisions than did women who did not participate (M = 3.50, SD 
= .24) in the grant-funded study, F (1, 133) = .54, p = .46.   
Measures 
      Cancer treatment decision vignettes were used to manipulate the message frame.  
Vignettes have been shown to be a useful way to examine decision making (Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1981). Participants were presented with three hypothetical situations: 91) breast 
cancer, (2) general cancer and (3) non-cancer. A complete copy of the measures can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Breast Cancer Vignette  
 The breast cancer vignette was adapted from Tversky and Kaheman (1979) and presented 
as follows: 
 You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer.  Otherwise, you are in 
an excellent state of health.  It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with 
this type of breast cancer this year.  There are two experimental treatment 
programs that involve equal amounts of both drug therapy and radiation.  Your 
physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for each treatment 
program.   Please rate the likelihood of choosing a treatment option (see treatment 
options below).  
General Cancer Vignette  
Participants were presented with a general (i.e., non-breast cancer specific) vignette to 
determine generalizability of results. The vignette was taken from Fagley and Miller (1987). 
            The National Institute for Cancer has two possible treatments for cancer, which 
            could become standard treatments across the country.  There are adequate 
            resources to implement only 1 program (see options below). 
Non-cancer Vignette  
  Participants were presented with a non-cancer vignette to determine generalizability of 
results. The vignette was taken from Simon, Fagley, and Halleran (2004). 
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           A ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean.  There are 
           600 people on the ship.  Their lives are in danger.  Two options are proposed.  
           Assume that the exact estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows: 
          (see options below). 
Frame 
The options for the each of the vignettes were framed either positively or negatively.  The 
wording of the options was based on the classic framing study by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1979). Outcomes for the positively and negatively framed treatment programs were objectively 
equivalent and would have equal expected outcomes.  Although Tversky and Kahneman (1979) 
scored their problems as categorical (i.e., risk taking or risk averse), a continuous measure of the 
likelihood of choosing a more or less risky treatment was used in this study.  Therefore, 
participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert-type scale modified from Levin, Gaeth, 
Schreiber, and Lauriola (2002) the likelihood of choosing each option.  The scale ranged from 1 
= Definitely Would Choose Treatment Option A to 7 = Definitely Would Choose Treatment 
Option B.  Higher numbers indicated greater preference for risky options.   Levin and colleagues 
found a significant mean difference score of 1.09 (p < .001) for positive and negative framed 
treatment programs. 
Breast cancer vignette.  For the breast cancer vignette, the positive and negative frames 
were as follows: 
        Positive Frame 
A) In treatment program A, 200 women will be cured. (risk averse) 
B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 women will be cured and a 2/3 
chance that no women will be cured.  (risk seeking) 
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           Negative Frame 
A) In treatment program A, 400 women will die. (risk averse) 
B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that no women will die, and a 2/3 
chance that 600 women will die. (risk seeking) 
General cancer vignette.  For the general cancer vignette, the positive and negative 
frames were as follows: 
Positive Frame 
            A) If treatment A is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 200 will be saved (risk 
                 averse). 
B) If treatment B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 
     chance that no people will be saved (risk seeking). 
            Negative Frame 
 
 A)  If treatment A is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 400 will die (risk 
                  averse). 
B)  If treatment B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die and a 2/3 
 chance that 600 people will die (risk seeking) 
 Non-cancer vignette. For the non-cancer vignette, the positive and negative frames were 
as follows: 
             Positive Frame 
 A)  If option A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (risk averse). 
 B)  If option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 
                 chance that none will be saved (risk seeking). 
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Negative Frame 
 
A)  In option A, 400 people will die (risk averse).  
B)  In option B, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die, and a 2/3 chance that 600 
       people will die (risk seeking) 
Sensation Seeking 
 According to Zuckerman (1994), sensation-seeking is a strong predictor of risky 
behavior.  The Impulsive Sensation Seeking Scale (ImpSS, Zuckerman) is used as a way to 
measure general risk-taking behavior.  Although the ImpSS has not been validated on older 
adults, currently the field lacks a better scale to access risk-taking propensity.  Participants were 
asked to state true or false as to whether they believe that each of 19 statements described them 
(e.g., “I like doing things just for the thrill of it”, “I often do things in impulse”).  Zuckerman 
reported Cronbach’s alphas that range from .77 to .82.  The ImpSS scale correlated highly with 
Zuckerman’s longer Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS, r = .66). Participants received 1 point for 
each “true” response, except for item 6, in which a “false” response received 1 point. Higher 
scores indicated higher sensation seeking.  Cronbach’s alpha for the current sample was .78.  
The scale had a possible range from 0 to 19; younger women had an actual range of 0 to 17 (M = 
9.59, SD = 4.04); older women had an actual range of 0 to 17 (M = 5.53, SD = 4.17; see Table 
4).  
Cognitive Ability 
     Crystallized and fluid intelligence.   Intelligence was assessed using the original 
Kauffman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT, Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990).  The K-BIT yields 
an overall intelligence score and separate measures of crystallized and fluid intelligence.  
There are three sections: expressive vocabulary, definitions, and matrices.  The expressive 
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vocabulary section consists of pictures that the participant is asked to name (e.g., fire 
hydrant).  The definitions section consists of clues and words with letters missing.  The 
participant is asked to fill in the missing letters and spell the word (e.g., Santa’s entrance = 
chimney).  The definitions section is timed; 30 seconds is allowed for each questions.  The 
matrices section consists of pictures and relationships between pictures.  Participants are 
asked which of the given options goes best with the given pictures or fits the blank (e.g., a 
truck goes with other vehicles).  The measure is an adequate substitution for the more 
commonly used WAIS (correlations between the two measures range from .52 to .75, 
Kaufman & Kaufman).  Test administrators were trained according to the instructions in 
the K-BIT manual.  Each research assistant must have correctly completed 3 practice 
sessions in order to administer the test.  The test took approximately 20 minutes for the 
younger women to complete and 45 minutes for the older women to complete.  
      Crystallized intelligence.  Crystallized intelligence scores were calculated, 
according to the K-BIT manual, by summing the raw scores for the expressive vocabulary 
and definitions sections and then translating the sum to a standardized score.  Raw scores 
were calculated by subtracting the numbers of errors from the highest item administered.  
For the crystallized intelligence score, younger women’s scores ranged from 84 to 128 (M 
= 100.81, SD = 9.44); older women’s scores ranged from 75 to 130 (M = 105.18, SD = 
12.93; see Table 4). 
     Fluid intelligence.  Fluid intelligence scores were calculated, according to the K-
BIT manual, by translating the raw score for the matrices section into a standardized score.  
Raw scores were calculated by subtracting the numbers of errors from the highest item 
administered.  For the fluid intelligence score, younger women’s scores ranged from 48 to 
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128 (M = 103.38, SD = 11.98); older women’s scores ranged from 44 to 126 (M = 102.91, 
SD = 15.97; see Table 4).   
    Composite score. A composite score was calculated, according to the K-BIT 
manual, by summing the standardized scores for crystallized and fluid intelligence. The 
sum was then translated into a standardized composite score. For the composite score, 
younger women’s scores ranged from 67 to 124 (M = 102.23, SD = 9.05); older women’s 
scores ranged from 61 to 132 (M = 104.15, SD = 13.96; see Table 4 for total sample 
means).  
    Working memory.  Forward and backward digit span tasks from the WAIS-R-III 
(Weschler, 1997) were used to access working memory.  For the forward digit span task, 
participants were asked to repeat a sequence of numbers in the same order as the 
administrator stated them.  For the backward digit span task, participants were asked to 
repeat a sequence of numbers in the opposite order in which the administrator presented 
them. For participants from the NIH funded study, there was approximately 2 months 
between assessment of working memory and completion of the decision-making tasks for 
some of the participants. Therefore, data on working memory was collected but not 
analyzed because this aspect of cognitive functioning is variable.   
Experience.  Experience has been shown to influence various aspects of the medical 
decision-making process (Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 1995; Snyder, 2004; Zwahr, 1999).  To 
assess personal experience, the participants were asked to indicate whether they had ever been 
diagnosed with breast cancer (yes/no), the month and year of diagnosis, type of treatment 
received, and whether the cancer was cured or is in remission.   To assess vicarious experience, 
the participants were asked if they had a close friend or relative who had been diagnosed with 
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breast cancer (yes/no), the relationship of the person diagnosed (e.g., relative or friend), how 
close they feel to that person, and the extent to which they were involved in that person’s 
medical decisions. Total experience was considered when the participant stated “yes” to at least 
one of the personal or vicarious experience problems.  Younger and older women did not 
significantly differ on total experience or vicarious experience reported (see Table 5). No 
younger women reported personal experience with breast cancer. 
Self-rated health. The 4-item self-rated health scale from the Multilevel Assessment 
Instrument (Lawton, Moss, Fulcomer & Kleban, 1982) was used to assess perceived health and 
was used as background information.  Participants were asked to rate their overall health at the 
present time from (1) Excellent to (4) Poor.  Participants were asked “Is your health now (1) 
Better, (2) About the Same, or (3) Not as Good as it was 3 Years Ago?”  Participants were asked 
if their health problems stand in the way (1) Not at All, (2) A Little or (3) A Great Deal of doing 
the things they want to do.  Participants were asked “Compared with most other people your age, 
would you say your health is: (1) Better, (2) The Same or (3) Not as Good. Raw scores were 
reversed so that higher scores indicated better-perceived health.  A total perceived health score 
was computed by summing the scores across each item. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the 
current sample was .76. The scale had a possible range from 4 to 16; younger women had an 
actual range of 7 to 13 (M = 10.44, SD = 1.54); older women had an actual range of 4 to 13 (M = 
9.25, SD = 2.12; see Table 4).  
 Type of cognitive processing and need for cognition.  The 31-item Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) was used to assess cognitive 
processing (i.e., analytical versus heuristic processing).  The REI consists of two unipolar 
subscales: a 19-item modified Need for Cognition scale (NFC, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) that 
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examines analytical processing and a new 12-item Faith in Intuition (FI) scale developed to 
examine heuristic processing.  Participants were asked to rate on a 5 point Likert-type scale from 
(1) Completely False to (5) Completely True the degree to which each statement described them.  
Epstein and colleagues reported that both subscales were sufficiently reliable: NFC alpha = .77; 
FI alpha = .80.   
To calculate need for cognition and faith in intuition scores, the average of the items 
within each subscale was computed.  To compute the need for cognition score, scale items 1, 2, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, and 18 were reverse scored so that higher scores indicated a 
higher need for cognition.  No items needed to be reverse scored to compute the faith in intuition 
score. Higher scores indicated a higher faith in intuition. To address the dual process 
conceptualization of cognitive processing, need for cognition and faith in intuition were analyzed 
as separate subscales.  
To address the notion that cognitive processing may be a unitary process, a total 
cognitive processing score was also computed by averaging all of the items.  Items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18 of the need for cognition scale, and all of the items on the faith in 
intuition scale (i.e., numbers 19-30) were reversed scored. Higher scores indicated higher 
analytical processing.    
In the current sample the need for cognition subscale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .77; the 
faith in intuition subscale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .80; and the total scale had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .76. Attempts to improve the reliability of the scale by dropping items failed. The total 
cognitive processing (analytical and heuristic combined) scale had a possible range from 0 to 5; 
younger women had an actual range of 1.74 to 3.90 (M = 2.95, SD = .40); older women had an 
actual range of 2.00 to 3.83 (M = 2.91, SD = .47).  The need for cognition scale had a possible 
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range from 0 to 5; younger women had an actual range of 1.58 to 4.37 (M = 3.27, SD = .52); 
older women had an actual range of 1.79 to 4.68 (M = 3.21, SD = .70).  The faith in intuition 
scale had a possible range from 0 to 5; younger women had an actual range of 1.75 to 4.67 (M = 
3.57, SD = .54); older women had an actual range of 2.42 to 4.92 (M = 3.56, SD = .52; see Table 
4 for descriptive information on older and younger women and total sample). Analyses were 
conducted with the two subscales (need for cognition and faith in intuition) and the total 
cognitive processing score. 
 Demographics information. A demographic questionnaire contained general questions 
regarding sex, age, race, education, residency, income, marital status (i.e., married, living as 
married, widowed, divorced, never married), living status (i.e., alone, with others), work history, 
current employment and statistics courses taken (for younger women only). As background 
health information, participants were asked to provide information regarding the gender of 
physician, frequency of doctor visits, access to health care and general health conditions.  As 
background information, knowledge about breast cancer was assessed using Vaeth’s (1993) 16-
item scale.  Participants were asked to state whether information concerning the risk factors and 
demographic information about breast cancer was True or False.  Participants received 1 point 
for each correct answer (i.e., “true” response to true statement, “false” response to false 
statement).  The scale had a possible range from 0 to 16; younger women had an actual range of 
8 to 15 (M = 11.43, SD = 1.70); older women had actual range of 7 to 15 (M = 11.11, SD = 1.87; 
see Table 4). 
Procedure 
    The study consisted of 1 session. The sessions took place either in 1) the Life-Span 
Developmental Research Laboratory in the Life Sciences Building at West Virginia 
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University, 2) various community senior centers, 3) residential living communities, and 4) 
older women’s homes. Participants completed the study alone in a quiet, private area. The 
study was described to the participants by the first author or a member of the research team 
which consisted of undergraduate and graduate research assistants.  Informed consent and 
HIPAA authorization was obtained.  The forward and backward digit span tasks were 
completed first.  The task took about 10 minutes for younger adults and 5 minutes for older 
adults. The K-BIT was administered next.  The test took approximately 20 minutes for the 
younger women to complete and 45 minutes for the older women to complete. Then 
participants were asked to complete the Decision Making Questionnaire, which consisted 
of the remainder of the self-report questionnaires.   Directions on how to complete the 
questionnaires were thoroughly described and any questions were answered via verbal 
explanation to the participant.  The order of the questionnaires was follows: vignettes, 
demographic information, the REI, the ImpSS, and the Knowledge Scale.  The entire 
session took approximately 1 hour for younger women and 1.5 hours for older women.  
The breast cancer vignette was presented first to all participants and was counterbalanced 
(i.e., half of the women received the positively framed vignette first and the other half 
received the negatively framed vignette first).  The general cancer and non-cancer vignettes 
were then presented and were also counterbalanced for a total of 16 versions.  The general 
cancer and non-cancer vignette were used to examine generalizability, or whether women’s 
decisions were specific to the breast cancer domain or were due to the wording of options 
regardless of domain.  In the primary analyses, frame was analyzed as a between-subjects 
variable. The first vignette that each woman received served as the frame, either positive or 
negative, and the women’s continuous score of the treatment option for that vignette served 
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as the dependent variable in the analyses of the effect of frame on breast cancer treatment 
decisions. Higher scores indicated riskier options.  
Results 
 Before conducting analyses, missing data for the treatment decision ratings for each of 
the vignettes was replaced using the overall mean within each domain and frame. For the 
positively framed breast cancer vignette, 5% of the data was replaced (2 of younger women, 5 of 
older women).  For the negatively framed breast cancer vignette, 4% of the data replaced (3 of 
younger women, 2 of older women).  For the positively framed general cancer vignette, 4% of 
the data was replaced (2 of younger women, 4 of older women).  For the negatively framed 
general cancer vignette, 5% of the data was replaced (1 of younger women, 6 of older women).  
For the positively framed non-cancer vignette, 6% of the data was replaced (3 of younger 
women, 5 of older women).  For the negatively framed non-cancer vignette, 3% of the data was 
replaced (2 of younger women, 2 of older women).  There was no distinguishable pattern to the 
missing data1. 
 Boxplots were used to screen for outliers separately for each vignette (breast cancer 
positively framed, breast cancer negatively framed, general cancer positively framed, general 
cancer negatively framed, non-cancer positively framed, non-cancer negatively framed).  Results 
indicated that no significant outliers were present. Skewness and kurtosis were used to examine 
normality of the data.   Although skewness and kurtosis values indicated a deviation from 
normality (i.e., did not equal zero), the sample size was large enough that deviation from 
normality would not make a substantive difference in analyses (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).   
 
                                                 
1 Results of analyses conducted without missing data imputed were not significantly different than those reported 
here. These data are available upon request. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for age, education, race, marital status, experience, knowledge about 
breast cancer, self-rated health, cognitive processing, need for cognition, faith in intuition, 
sensation seeking, intelligence (total), crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, and income 
were examined for both the younger and older adult age groups (see Table 4 and Table 5).  
The Influence of Age and Frame on Treatment decision 
To address research question 1, (How do age and framing of the message (positive or 
negative) affect women’s choice of treatment options for breast cancer?) a hierarchical 
regression was conducted to examine the affect of age and frame on treatment decision.  Frame 
was dummy coded; positive frame = 1, and negative frame = 0.  Age and frame were predictor 
variables and were entered in the first step of the regression.  The interaction of age x frame was 
computed, centered, and entered in the second step of the regression.  Treatment decision was the 
criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable. Age was entered as a continuous 
variable in the regression.  Results indicated that age and frame accounted for a significant 
amount of treatment decision variability, R2 = .14, F (2, 133) = 10.92, p < .001.  Age was not a 
predictor of treatment decision, t (133) = 1.21, p = .23. Frame significantly predicted treatment 
decision, t (133) = -4.52, p < .001. As predicted, women presented with the negative frame 
endorsed riskier treatment decisions.  The model that included the age x frame interaction 
accounted for a significant account of the treatment decision variance, R2 = .23, F (3, 133) = 
12.93, p < .001.  The age x frame interaction term accounted for a significant portion of the 
variance in treatment decision, t (133) = -3.83, p < .00 (see Table 6).  
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The Age x Frame Interaction  
 In order to localize the age x frame effect found in the analysis for research question 1, a 
2 (age group) x 2 (frame) ANOVA was conducted.  Older (i.e., over the age of 60 years) and 
younger (i.e., between the ages of 18-29 years) were recruited in order to examine age 
differences.  Thus, age was entered as a between-subjects categorical subject variable, frame was 
a between-subjects independent variable, and the continuous rating of treatment decision was the 
dependent variable. Results showed a significant main effect of frame, F (1, 133) = 23.07, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .15, and a significant age x frame interaction, F (1, 133) = 14.98, p < .01, partial 
η2 = .10.  Follow-up ANOVAs showed that older women presented with the negative frame (M = 
5.06, SD = 1.81) indicated a greater likelihood of choosing a risk-seeking treatment option than 
did older women presented with the positive frame (M = 2.62, SD = 1.94).  For younger women, 
there were no significant differences in ratings for the negatively (M = 3.60, SD = 1.00) or 
positively (M = 3.34, SD = 1.61) framed treatment options (see Figure 3). Thus, the hypothesis 
that there would be an age x frame effect was supported. Frame influenced older women’s 
decisions but did not influence in younger women’s decisions. 
Cognitive Processing as a Mediator  
 To address research question 2, (Does type of cognitive processing mediate age 
differences in treatment decision?) cognitive processing was examined using a mediation and a 
mediation moderation model. According to Holmbeck (1997), structural equation modeling may 
be the best strategy to examine mediators and moderators due to control of error; however, the 
current sample size (N = 134) was too small to use the technique. In the current study, Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) criteria for establishing a mediated moderation model were used. The criteria are 
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follows: first, age and frame must both have a significant effect on treatment decision 
(determined in analysis for research question 1 above; see Paths a1 and a2 in Figure 4).  Second, 
for type of cognitive processing to mediate the relationship between age and treatment decision, 
age must affect type of cognitive processing (see Path b1 in Figure 4) and type of cognitive 
processing must affect treatment decision (Path b2 in Figure 4).  Two hierarchical regression 
analyses would test these requirements: (1) age, frame, and age x frame (centered and entered 
into separate step of the regression) as predictors and type of cognitive processing as the criterion 
variable; and (2) age, frame, and age x frame (centered and entered into separate step of the 
regression) as the predictors and treatment decision as the criterion variable.  To demonstrate 
complete mediation, age would not affect treatment decision when type of processing was 
controlled (see Path a1 in Figure 4).  Mediated moderation would be indicated if age x frame 
affected treatment decision (see Path c2 in Figure 4), and age x frame affected type of cognitive 
processing (see Path c1 in figure 4), and type of cognitive processing affecting age (see Path b1 in 
Figure 4).  The final step in the criteria is tested via a regression with age, frame, type of 
cognitive processing, age x frame, and type of cognitive processing x frame (each interaction 
centered and entered in separate steps of the regression) as the predictors and treatment decision 
as the criterion variable.  For cognitive processing to moderate the relationship between age and 
frame, the effect of age x frame on treatment decision must be reduced from the previous 
regressions (1) and (2) above (as indicated by a decrease in the β weights).  
The hierarchical regression conducted to answer research question 1 indicated that age 
did not significantly affect treatment decision, t (133) = 1.21, p = .23; therefore, Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) criteria for establishing a mediation, or mediated moderation model were not 
met. Thus, the hypothesis that cognitive processing would mediate the age x frame effect was not 
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supported because there was no main effect of age on treatment decision.  Cognitive processing 
was examined as a predictor in the exploratory analyses described in the exploratory analyses 
section. 
Individual Characteristics as Moderator Variables 
To address research question 3, individual difference characteristics were tested as 
moderator variables.  In order to establish that individual characteristic variables moderate the 
relationship between frame and treatment decision, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria for 
establishing moderation must be met.  First, frame must be related to treatment decision 
(determined in analysis for research question 1; see Path a in Figure 2).  Second, the moderator 
variable (individual characteristic) must be related to treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2).  
Finally, the moderator variable x frame interaction must be significant in order to demonstrate a 
moderator effect (see Path c in Figure 2). The first step was established in the analysis for 
research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = -4.52, p < .00 
(i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant).  The second step in the moderator model was that each 
moderator variable was a significant predictor of treatment decision. Analyses for each potential 
moderator variable are described below. 
Cognitive Ability 
To establish that cognitive ability moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision, 1) 
frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) cognitive ability must affect 
treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x cognitive ability interaction must 
affect treatment decision (see Path c in Figure 2).  As noted above, step 1 was established in the 
analysis for research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = -
4.52, p < .00 (i.e., Path c in Figure 2 was significant).  Analyses were conducted to test each 
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index of cognitive ability (i.e., K-BIT composite as a measure of intelligence, K-BIT vocabulary 
as a measure of crystallized intelligence, K-BIT vocabulary as a measure of fluid intelligence) as 
a potential moderator. 
Intelligence. A linear regression was conducted to examine the effect of intelligence, as 
assessed by the composite K-BIT score, on treatment decision.  Intelligence was the predictor 
and treatment decision was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable. 
Intelligence did not significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .01, F (1, 133) = 1.13, p = .29 
(Path b in Figure 2 was not significant).  Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was 
not met; therefore, intelligence did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment 
decision (see Table 7). 
Crystallized intelligence.  A linear regression was conducted to examine the effect of 
crystallized intelligence on treatment decision.  Crystallized intelligence was the predictor and 
treatment decision was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  Crystallized 
intelligence did not significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .17, F (1, 133) = 3.84, p = .06 
(Path b in Figure 2 was not significant).  Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was 
not met; therefore, crystallized intelligence did not moderate the relationship between frame and 
treatment decision (see Table 7). 
Fluid intelligence.  A linear regression was conducted to examine the effect of fluid 
intelligence on treatment decision.  Fluid intelligence was the predictor and treatment decision 
was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  Fluid intelligence did not 
significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .06, F (1, 133) = .46, p = .50 (Path b in Figure 2 
was not significant).  Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was not met; therefore, 
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fluid intelligence did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision (see 
Table 7). 
Experience 
  To establish that experience moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision, 1) 
frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) experience must affect treatment 
decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x experience interaction must affect treatment 
decision (see Path c in Figure 2).  As noted earlier, step 1 was established in the analysis for 
research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = -4.52, p < .00 
(i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant).  A linear regression was conducted to examine the 
effect of experience on treatment decision.  Experience was the predictor and treatment decision 
was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  Experience did not 
significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .00, F (1, 133) = .15, p = .29 (Path b in Figure 2 
was not significant).  Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was not met; therefore, 
experience did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision (see Table 7). 
Thus, the hypothesis that experience would moderate the relationship between frame and 
decision was not supported. 
Sensation Seeking 
 To establish that sensation seeking moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision, 
1) frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) sensation seeking must affect 
treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x sensation seeking interaction must 
affect treatment decision (see Path c in Figure 2).  As noted earlier, step 1 was established in the 
analysis for research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) = -
4.52, p < .001 (i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant).  A linear regression was conducted to 
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examine the effect of sensation seeking on treatment decision.  Sensation seeking was the 
predictor and treatment decision was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous 
variable.  Sensation seeking did not significantly predict treatment decision, R2 = .09, F (1, 133) 
= 1.14, p = .29 (Path b in Figure 2 was not significant).  Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a 
moderator effect was not met; therefore, sensation seeking did not moderate the relationship 
between frame and treatment decision (see Table 7). The hypothesis that sensation seeking 
would moderate the relationship of frame and decision was not supported. 
Need for Cognition.  
To establish that need for cognition moderated the effect of frame on treatment decision, 
1) frame must affect treatment decision (see Path a in Figure 2), 2) need for cognition must affect 
treatment decision (see Path b in Figure 2), and 3) the frame x need for cognition interaction 
must affect treatment decision (see Path c in Figure 2).  As noted earlier, step 1 was established 
in the analysis for research question 1; frame did significantly predict treatment decision, t (133) 
= -4.52, p < .001 (i.e., Path a in Figure 2 was significant).  A linear regression was conducted to 
examine the effect of need for cognition on treatment decision.  Need for cognition was the 
predictor and treatment decision was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous 
variable.  Need for cognition (β = -.18), t (133) = -2.13, p < .05, significantly predicted treatment 
decision, R2 = .03, F (1, 133) = 4.47, p < .05 (i.e., Path b in Figure 2 was significant). Women 
who scored lower on the need for cognition scale endorsed riskier decisions than women who 
scored higher on the need for cognition scale.   
In order to establish that need for cognition moderated the effect of frame on treatment 
decision, the frame x need for cognition interaction must also significantly affect treatment 
decision.  A hierarchical regression was conducted to examine the effect of frame and need for 
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cognition on treatment decision.  Frame and need for cognition were predictor variables and 
were entered in the first step of the regression.  The interaction of frame x need for cognition was 
computed, centered and entered in the second step of the regression.  Treatment decision was the 
criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  The regression model that contained 
frame, need for cognition, and the frame x need for cognition interaction was significant, R2 = 
.16, F (2, 133) = 12.11, p < .001.  However, analysis of the beta weights indicated that frame was 
the only significant predictor variable, t (133) = -4.37, p < .001.  The frame x need for cognition 
interaction was not a significant predictor of treatment decision (Path c in Figure 2 was not 
significant).  Baron and Kenny’s criteria for a moderator effect was not met; therefore, need for 
cognition did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment decision (see Table 8). 
Thus, the hypothesis that need for cognition would moderate the relationship of frame and 
decision was not supported. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Generalizability. In order to examine whether the frame effect found in the analysis 
conducted to address research question 1 was specific to the breast cancer domain, a 3 (domain) 
x 2(frame) x 2(age group) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted.  Results indicated 
significant main effects of domain, F (2, 131) = 5.19, p < .05, partial η2 = .07, and frame, F (2, 
131) = 5.19, p < .05, partial η2 = .07.  There were significant two-way interactions for frame x 
age group, F (1, 132) = 25.31, p < .00, partial η2 = .16, and domain x frame, F (2, 132) = 6.23, p 
< .05, partial η2 = .09.  The three-way interaction of domain x frame x age group was also 
significant, F (2, 131) = 4.65, p < .05, partial η2 = .07.   
To localize the effect and examine the question of generalizability, a 3 (domain) x 2 
(frame) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted for each age group.   For younger women, 
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there was a significant main effect for domain, F (2, 66) = 3.49, p < .05, partial η2 = .16.  Simple 
contrasts that compared the general cancer and non-cancer domains to the breast cancer domain 
were conducted to follow up the significant main effect.  Results showed a significant difference 
between the non-cancer and breast cancer domains, F (1, 67) = 6.83, p < .01, partial η2 = .09.   
Young women made riskier decisions in the non-cancer domain as compared to the breast cancer 
domain (see Table 9).  There was no main effect of frame or a domain x frame interaction for the 
young women in this sample.   
For older women, a 3 (domain) x 2 (frame) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted 
for older women.  Results indicated a significant two-way interaction of domain and frame, F (2, 
64) = 8.97, p < .00, η2 = .02. Paired sample t-tests that compared the positive and negative 
frames in each domain were used to follow up the significant two-way interaction in order to 
examine the generalizability of the results.  Results indicated a significant difference in older 
women’s decisions in the positive frame as compared to the negative frame in all three domains: 
breast cancer domain, t (65) = -2.13, p < .05, general cancer domain, t (65) = -5.51, p < .001, and 
non-cancer domain, t (65) = -3.21, p < .05 (see Table 9 and Figure 5). That is, for older women, 
frame affected decisions in all three domains (breast cancer, general cancer, and non-cancer). 
Older women made riskier decisions when presented with the negative frame, regardless of 
domain.  Domain did make a difference in younger adults’ decisions; however, frame did not. 
Thus, results of the current study can not be explained as specific to the breast cancer domain.   
To localize the domain x frame interaction for older women, paired sample t-tests were 
conducted for each domain combination in each frame.  In the positive frame, older women’s 
decisions in the general cancer domain (M = 3.20, SD = 2.02) were significantly different from 
decisions in the breast cancer domain (M = 2.81, SD = 1.94), t (66) = -1.54, p = .13.  In the 
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positive frame, older women’s decisions in the non-cancer domain (M = 3.77, SD = 2.10) were 
significantly different than decisions in the breast cancer, t (66) = -4.22, p < .00, and general 
cancer, t (66) = -2.34, p < .05, domains. In the positive frame, older women made significantly 
riskier decisions in the non-cancer domain as compared to both the breast cancer and general 
cancer domains.  There were no significant domain differences in older women’s decisions in the 
negative frame.  
Self-rated health. In order to examine the effect of self-rated health on treatment decision, 
a linear regression was conducted.  Self-rated health was the predictor variable and treatment 
decision was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  Results indicated that 
self-rated health (β = -.02) did not account for a significant amount of treatment decision 
variability, R2 = .02, F (1, 133) = .037, p = .85 (see Table 4 for descriptive information on self-
rated health). 
Comfort speaking to physician. Participants were asked to rate on a Likert-type scale 
from 1 (Not At All Comfortable) to 5 (Very Comfortable) how comfortable they were speaking to 
their physician about their health. In order to examine the effect of level of comfort speaking to 
physician on treatment decision, a linear regression was conducted.  Level of comfort speaking 
to physician was the predictor variable and treatment decision was the criterion.  Treatment 
decision was a continuous variable.  Results indicated that level of comfort speaking to physician 
(β = .08) did not account for a significant amount of treatment decision variability, R2 = .01, F (1, 
133) = .95, p = .33. 
Comfort asking for second opinion. Participants were asked to rate on a Likert-type scale 
from 1 (Not At All Comfortable) to 5 (Very Comfortable) how comfortable they were asking for a 
second opinion. In order to examine the effect of comfort asking for a second opinion on 
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treatment decision, a linear regression was conducted.  Comfort asking for a second opinion was 
the predictor variable and treatment decision was the criterion.  Treatment decision was a 
continuous variable.  Results indicated that comfort asking for a second opinion (β = .04) did not 
account for a significant amount of treatment decision variability, R2 = .04, F (1, 133) = .24, p = 
.63. 
 Cognitive processing and treatment decision.  Although Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
criteria for establishing cognitive processing as a mediator or moderator of the age x frame 
interaction were not met, as an exploratory analysis, a linear regression was conducted to 
examine the effect of cognitive processing on treatment decision.  Cognitive processing was the 
predictor and treatment decision was the criterion. Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  
Results indicated that the overall measure of cognitive processing (i.e., analytical and heuristic 
processing combined) was not related to treatment decision, R2 = .16, F (1, 131) = 3.61, p = .06 
(see Table 10).  When cognitive processing was examined as a dual process, heuristic processing 
(i.e., faith in intuition) was not related to treatment decision, R2 = .02, F (1, 131) = .04, p = .85 
(see Table 10).  However, analytical processing (i.e., need for cognition) was significantly 
related to treatment decision, R2 = .18, F (1, 131) = 4.45, p < .05. Women with lower need for 
cognition made riskier decisions than did women high greater need for cognition (see Table 10).   
 The influence of age and frame on cognitive processing. A hierarchical regression was 
conducted to examine the effect of age, frame, and age x frame on cognitive processing (Paths 
b1, a1, and c2 in Figure 4) in an attempt to better understand the age x frame interaction.  Age and 
frame were predictor variables and were entered in the first step of the regression.  Frame was 
dummy coded; positive frame = 1 and negative frame = 0.  The interaction of age x frame was 
computed, centered and entered in the second step of the regression.  Total cognitive processing 
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score (i.e., analytical and heuristic processing combined) was the criterion.  Age was entered as a 
continuous variable.  Results indicated that age and frame did not account for a significant 
amount of the variance in total cognitive processing, R2 = .02, F (2, 133) = 1.30, p = .28 (Paths b1 
and a1 in Figure 4 were not significant).  In addition, the age x frame interaction did not account 
for a significant proportion of the variance in cognitive processing, R2 = .04, F (3, 133) = 1.62, p 
= .19 (Path c2 in Figure 4 was not significant).  
 Recent statistics course. Younger women were asked if they had recently taken a 
statistics course (yes or no).  Eighteen women indicated that they had recently taken a statistics 
course and 50 women indicated that they had not recently taken a statistics course. To examine 
whether recently taking a statistics course influenced susceptibility to the framing effect, a 
Univariate ANOVA was conducted with statistics course taken as the independent variable and 
treatment decision as the dependent variable.  Treatment decision was a continuous variable.  
Results indicated that recently taking a statistics course did not affect treatment decision, F (1, 
67) = 2.42, p = .12, partial η2 = .04. 
Decisions for breast cancer, general cancer, and non-cancer.  Younger and older women 
rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale modified from Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, and Lauriola (2002) 
the likelihood of choosing each option.  The scale ranges from 1 = Definitely Would Choose 
Treatment Option A to 7 = Definitely Would Choose Treatment Option B.  The option “4” would 
be equivalent to the participant rating no preference between the two options.  For both the 
positive and negative frame in the breast cancer domain and general cancer domains, a greater 
percentage of younger women chose option “4” than did older women. In the non-cancer 
domain, a greater percentage of younger women chose option “4” than did older women in the 
negative frame but not the positive frame (see Table 11).  
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Discussion 
The Interaction of Age and Frame 
 The hypothesis that frame would have more of an effect on older women’s treatment 
decisions about breast cancer than on younger women’s treatment decisions about breast cancer 
was supported.  Frame influenced older women’s decisions but did not influence younger 
women’s decisions.  When presented with a negatively framed treatment option (i.e., worded in 
terms of number of women who would die), older women endorsed riskier decisions than when 
presented with a positively framed treatment option (i.e., worded in terms of number of women 
who would live; see Figure 3).  This is consistent with the findings from the classic framing 
study (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) that negatively framed messages lead to riskier decisions 
than positively framed messages.  When options were worded in terms of number of deaths, 
older women reported that they would choose a treatment option that had a “chance” to save a 
greater number of persons instead of endorsing a treatment option that was reported to be a “sure 
thing” and would only save a small number of persons.  However, for younger women, there was 
no main effect for frame; therefore, the hypothesis that frame would affect treatment decision, or 
that positively worded treatment options would lead to more risk averse decisions, was only 
partially supported.   
For younger women, there was no significant difference in treatment decision regardless 
of the way in which the treatment options were worded.  This finding is inconsistent with the 
literature.  Very little research has examined the effect of age on frame; thus, most of the 
literature to date has reported the effect of frame on samples of younger adults.  Although  
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Kuhberger (1998) reports that effect sizes for frame are small to moderate, the majority of the 
literature on framing does find that the ways in which messages are worded influences decisions 
(see Kuhberger for a review).  In the current study, frame did not influence younger women’s 
decisions in any domain (i.e., breast cancer, general cancer, non-cancer); whereas, frame 
influenced older women’s decisions in all domains (i.e., breast cancer, general cancer, non-
cancer).  This inconsistent finding for younger women is interesting given the number of studies 
in the literature that show a framing effect.  Perhaps this finding is due to experience with test 
taking in general.  Undergraduate college students are offered extra credit to participate in 
research studies, and there are generally quite a few studies for which they can volunteer.  
Perhaps the younger women in the sample have participated in research before and have 
experience with the test taking process.  However, it should be noted that the younger adults in 
other studies that show a framing effect may also have experience with general test taking and 
research participation.  In addition, examination of the means (see Table 9) shows a slight trend 
toward the framing effect in the younger women in the same direction as that of the older 
women.  Although a power analysis showed the sample to have sufficient power to detect 
medium effect sizes, Kuhberger (1998) states that the effects of frame are small to moderate. 
Perhaps a larger sample size would show an effect for frame for younger women.    
The finding that the negative frame leads to riskier decisions for older women may be 
due to the idea of perceived time left to live, or future time perspective.  According to Lang and 
Carstensen (2004) older individuals have a more limited future time perspective than do younger 
individuals. Future time perspective has been shown to influence health behaviors (Yarcheski, 
Mahon, Yarcheski, & Cannella, 2004). Perhaps older women perceived that they had a more 
limited time left to live and therefore were more likely to endorse alternatives that would 
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increase the chance of survival. In addition, perhaps, older adults feel that they have more things 
to accomplish before death so they would want to take chances that may increase survival.   
The literature to date is inconsistent as to the effect of age on the susceptibility of the 
framing effect.  Few studies have examined the interaction of age and frame.  Mayhorn, Fisk, 
and Whittle (2002) examined the influence of age on medical and financial decisions and 
suggested that there are minimal age differences.  McKee (2001) examined medical decision 
making and found that younger adults may be slightly more influenced by the frame than are 
older adults. The current study indicates that there are age differences in the susceptibility of 
frame; however, those differences may not be due to individual differences in cognitive capacity, 
processing, or experience, but may be due to a person’s future time perspective.  Future studies 
need to examine how frame influences the process of medical decision making in older adults, 
younger adults, and terminally ill patients in order to test the future time perspective hypothesis. 
Processing as a Mediator 
 Type of cognitive processing was expected to mediate the significant interaction of age 
and frame.  Although chronological age is often associated with poorer decision making and 
problem solving (Thorton & Dumke, 2005), age is merely a marker, or proxy, variable.  That is, 
age in itself does not cause changes in decision making but may be associated with another 
variable that does.  Type of cognitive processing was expected to account for age differences in 
the effect of frame.  The hypothesis was not supported.  Type of cognitive processing (i.e., 
analytical and heuristic combined), did not affect treatment decisions (see Table 10).  When 
analytic and heuristic processing were examined as dual processes, faith in intuition (i.e., 
heuristic processing) was not associated with treatment decisions.  Need for cognition (i.e., 
analytical processing), however, was associated with treatment decision.   
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Need for cognition.  The hypothesis that frame would influence treatment decision in 
women with a low need for cognition to a greater extent than it would for women high in need 
for cognition was not supported.  Need for cognition did significantly affect treatment decision; 
women who scored lower in need for cognition made riskier decisions regardless of how 
information was framed.  However, there was not an interaction of frame and need for cognition; 
therefore, need for cognition did not moderate the relationship between frame and treatment 
decision (see Table 8).  This is inconsistent with previous research that indicated need for 
cognition was negatively associated with susceptibility of framing effects (Chatterjee, Heath, 
Milberg, & France, 2000; Simon et al., 2004; Smith & Levin, 1998).  There was trend towards 
significance for the interaction.  Perhaps with a larger sample size the effect would emerge. 
Thus, of the variables examined, need for cognition seems the most promising predictor of 
treatment decisions.   
 There is a lack of measures available to examine heuristic and analytical processing.  The 
literature to date lacks information on the construct validity of the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996).  Although the need for cognition 
scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) has been used numerous times, the version used in the REI 
was a shortened version with 19 items.  There is a lack of information on the construct validity of 
the short version of the need for cognition scale used in the current study.  Epstein and 
colleagues reported reliability of .77 for the need for cognition subscale and .80 for the faith in 
intuition (FI) subscale.  In the current sample the need for cognition subscale also had reliability 
of .77, and the faith in intuition subscale also had reliability of .80.  Although Epstein and 
colleagues state that the reliabilities are acceptable, one could expect higher reliabilities of scales 
with those number of items (i.e., NFC = 19 items, FI = 12 items).  Future studies need to be 
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conducted to examine the reliability and construct validity of the REI.  Perhaps better measures 
to examine heuristic and analytical processing would indicate that cognitive processing 
influences susceptibility of the framing effect. 
Potential Moderators 
 Cognitive ability. The hypothesis that women with low cognitive ability scores would be 
influenced more by the frame than would individuals who scored higher on cognitive ability was 
not supported.  Neither cognitive ability; intelligence (i.e., the K-BIT composite score), fluid 
intelligence (i.e., the K-BIT matrices scores), nor crystallized intelligence (i.e., the K-BIT 
vocabulary score), was significantly related to treatment decision (see Table 7).  The current 
sample was homogenous.  The women were highly educated and had high scores on the 
cognitive ability measures; therefore, it was not possible to thoroughly examine the influence 
that cognitive ability would have on susceptibility to the framing effect due to restriction of 
range. 
 Experience.  The hypothesis that frame would influence women with experience with 
breast cancer more than women with no experience of breast cancer was not supported.  
Experience was not significantly related to treatment decision (see Table 7).  There were no 
younger adults in the sample who had personal experience with breast cancer, as was expected.  
It is rare for women under the age of 30 years to be diagnosed with breast cancer (ACS, 2005).  
Vicarious experience, or experience with breast cancer through a friend or family member’s 
diagnosis, was also considered experience.  Although both personal and vicarious experience 
have been shown to influence decision making with everyday problems (Patrick & Strough, 
2004); personal experience with a health problem may be conceptually different from vicarious 
experience with a health problem.  Only a small number of older women reported personal 
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experience with breast cancer (N = 11 or 16.7%).  A larger number of women with personal 
experience with breast cancer would have allowed a better examination of the effect of 
experience on treatment decisions.   
Sensation seeking.  The hypothesis that frame would not influence treatment decisions for 
women who scored extremely high (risk takers) or extremely low (risk avoiders) on sensation 
seeking was not supported.  It was expected that general risk-taking propensity would override 
the influence of frame.  That is, regardless of the way in which options were worded, women 
high in sensation seeking were expected to make riskier decisions; whereas, women low in 
sensation seeking were expected to make less risky decisions. Although younger women scored 
higher than older women on sensation seeking; it was not related to treatment decision (see Table 
7).  Perhaps general risk-taking propensity was not related to treatment decision due to the 
measure used to assess risk taking.  There were very few scales available to measure general 
risk-taking propensity.  The sensation-seeking measure was the best available at the time of the 
current study.  The sensation seeking measure assessed risk taking in behaviors related to general 
activities (e.g., trip planning).  There were no questions that dealt with risk taking in health 
behaviors.  Perhaps risk taking in the domain of health may be qualitatively different than other 
domains (e.g., driving behavior); thus, perhaps a risk-taking scale that examines risky behavior 
specifically in the domain of health would yield different results. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
  One limitation of the current study is the self-report nature of predicted behavior in 
response to a hypothetical vignette.  Participants were asked to report on how they would react if 
they were faced with a similar situation.  Although vignettes have been shown to be a useful 
way to examine problem-solving strategies (Berg, 1989; Blanchard-Fields, et al., 1995; Watson 
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& Blanchard-Fields, 1998), one cannot be certain how they will react unless faced with actual 
problem.   Researchers may draw information from the research conducted using laboratory 
experimental methods (Johnson, 1993; Berg, Johnson, Meegan, & Strough, 2004); however, 
reactions to real-world situation may differ from those in the laboratory.  It is possible that older 
adults may react differently if they were actually faced with a similar situation. In addition, it is 
unlikely that women diagnosed with breast cancer would be presented with probability statistics 
worded the same as the vignettes used in the current study.  Participants, particularly older 
women, stated that the vignettes were “difficult to answer.”  The wording of the treatment 
options may have been confusing, perhaps more confusing than the way options are presented to 
women in real-world situations.  Future studies should examine the decision-making process of 
women actually diagnosed with the disease. The best strategy would be longitudinal studies that 
examine the ways in which individuals diagnosed with the disease make decisions throughout 
the course of the disease.   
  Another limitation is the use of a convenience sample.  Individuals who volunteer to 
participate in studies tend to very healthy, more educated, and more motivated than the general 
population.   In addition, this sample was highly homogenous.  The sample consisted of highly 
educated, middle class, predominantly Caucasian women.  Given the health disparities between 
races (Myers, Lewis & Parker-Dominguez, 2003), older adults of different races and ethnic 
backgrounds would likely respond differently to the vignettes.  Researchers should strive to 
oversample minorities in order to have a better understanding of racial and ethnic differences in 
medical decision making.  In addition, in the future, a more diverse population with varying 
degrees of education should be examined.  
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Conclusions 
 Findings from the current study indicate that the ways in which treatment options are 
worded influences the treatment options that older women endorse when presented with a breast 
cancer vignette. Health professionals can draw upon these results when developing ways to 
present various treatment options to patients. Women diagnosed with breast cancer also need to 
be aware of the effect that wording alone can have on treatment decisions.  In addition, the 
results contribute to the literature that examines age differences in the framing effect.  Studies 
that examine age differences in the framing effect need to be conducted using other designs and 
other types of wording options (e.g., survival curves) in order to gain a better understanding of 
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Table 1 
 
Cognitive Processing: Heuristic Versus Analytical (modified from Slovic, Finucane, 




Heuristic System Analytic System 
1.  Holistic 1.  Analytic 
2.  Affective: pleasure-pain oriented 2.  Logical: reason oriented (what is 
sensible) 
3.  Associationistic connections 3.  Logical connections 
4.  Behavior mediated by “vibes” from past 
experiences 
5.  Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors, and narratives 
4.  Behavior medicated by conscious 
appraisal of events 
5.  Encodes reality in abstract symbols, 
words, and numbers 
6.  More rapid processing: oriented toward 
immediate action 
6.  Slower processing: oriented toward 
delayed action 
7.  Self-evidently valid: “experiencing is 
believing” 
7.  Requires justification via logic and 
evidence 
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Table 2  
 











 Mean SD Mean  SD F (1, 133) p n2  
(partial) 
 




 11.37   1.66   11.14   1.94 .55    .46 .00 
        




   2.94     .46     2.93     .42 .00    .93 .00 
 
 
Need for Cognition    3.24     .65     3.25     .57 .00    .96 .00 
 
 
Faith in Intuition    3.55     .52     3.58     .55  .07    .80 .00 
 
Sensation Seeking    7.11   4.71     8.22   4.33      1.99    .16 .02 
 
 




104.68 11.91 100.71 10.53      4.05    .05 .03 
 
 
Fluid Intelligence 103.76 13.03 102.34 15.33  .33    .56 .00 
 
Income ($)  16973 17322  10862 12948 5.059    .03 .04 
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Table 3 
 
Experience with Breast Cancer for Women From and Not From the NIH Study 
 
  
From NIH Study 
 
Not From NIH Study 
  














47.4% 29.3% 4.49  .05 
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Table 4  
 



















  Total  Older Women Younger Women    
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD F (1, 133) p η2 
(partial) 
Age (years)  44.54 26.41        
Education (years)  13.64   1.70   13.39    2.13   13.88   1.09   2.81    .09 .02 
Knowledge about 
Breast Cancer 
 11.27   1.79   11.11   1.87   11.43  1.70   1.08    .30 .01 
 
 
Self-Rated Health     9.86   1.94     9.25   2.12   10.44  1.54 13.72    .00 .09 
Cognitive Processing      3.37     .42     2.91     .47     2.95    .41     .23    .63 .00 
 
Need for Cognition     3.24     .61     3.21     .70     3.28    .52     .41    .53 .00 
Faith in Intuition     3.56     .53     3.56     .52     3.57    .54     .01    .94 .00 
Sensation Seeking     8.12   4.21     5.53   4.17     9.59  4.04 32.75    .00 .20 
Intelligence 103.20 11.72 104.15 13.96 102.27  9.05     .85    .36 .01 
Crystallized 
Intelligence 
102.96 11.47 105.18 12.92 100.81  9.44   5.02    .03 .04 
Fluid Intelligence 103.14  14.03 102.91 15.97 103.38 11.98      .04    .85 .00 
Income ($) 14382 15820  21969 17406    6911  9464  39.01    .00 .23 
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Table 5 
 
Experience with Breast Cancer for Older and Younger Women  
 
 Total Older Women Younger Women 
 
  














60.4% 56.1% 64.7%  1.05 .31 
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Table 6  
 

















R2 =.14 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .09 for Step2. 
Variable B SE B β t p 
Step 1    
 
  
Age    .01 .01 .10 
 
 1.21 .23 
Frame -1.34 .30        -.37 -4.52 .00 
      
Step 2    
 
  
Age    .01 .01 .11 
 
 1.40 .17 
Frame -1.34 .28 -.37 
 
-4.75 .00 
Age x Frame  -.04 .01 -.30 
 
-3.83 .00 
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Table 7 
 
Summary of Separate Linear Regressions of Cognitive Ability, Experience, and Sensation 


































.03 .01 .17 
 
 
  .60 .06 .03 
Fluid 
Intelligence 
.01 .01 .06 
 
 
  .68 .50 .06 
Experience -.13 .33 -.09 
 
 -.38 .70 .00 
Sensation 
Seeking 
-.04 .04 -.19 
 
 
-1.00 .32 .01 
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Table 8  
 

























R2 = .40 for Step 1; ∆R2 = .00 




     
Frame -1.29 .24 -.35 
 
-4.47 .00 
Need for Cognition   -.45 .30 -.15 -1.86 .06 
      
Model 2 
 
     
Frame -1.29 .30 -.35 
 
-4.36 .00 
Need for Cognition   -.45 .24 -.15 -1.85 .07 
Frame x Need for Cognition    .22 .49   .04 .455 .65 
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Table 9 
 
Older and Younger Women’s Means Decision (Standard Error) in All Domains 
 
Note: Matching letters in each row equals significant difference.  Matching letters in each 




  Younger 
Women 
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Table 10 
 
Summary of Separate Linear Regressions of Cognitive Processing, Need for Cognition, and 
Faith in Intuition on Treatment Choice (N = 134) 
 
 
















Need for Cognition -.54 .26 -.18 
 
-2.11 .04 .18 
Faith in Intuition .05 .30 .02 
 
.20 .85 .02 
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Table 11 
 
Frequencies of Treatment Decision Ratings for the Total Sample and Older and Younger Women 
 Total Older Women Younger Women 
 
  
 Percentage Percentage Percentage  X2 p 
 
Breast Cancer +      
1 21.6 34.8   8.8 1.30 .25 
2 15.7 16.7 14.7   .97 .33 
3   7.5   6.1   8.8   .19 .66 
4 31.3 21.2 41.2 4.13 .04 
5   8.2   1.5 14.7   .08 .78 
6   3.7   1.5   5.9   .03 .86 
7   6.7 10.6   5.9   .10 .76 
Missing    5.2   7.6   2.9   
Breast Cancer -      
1   5.2   9.1   1.5   .05 .83 
2   7.5   6.1   8.8   .19 .66 
3   9.0   1.5 16.2   .09 .76 
4 33.6 21.2 45.6 4.71 .03 
5 16.4 15.2 17.6 1.06 .30 
6 16.7   9.1   4.4   .15 .70 
7 17.9 34.8   1.5   .21 .65 
Missing   3.7   3.0   4.4   
General Cancer +      
1 15.7 30.3   1.5   .18 .67 
2 12.7   9.1 16.2   .56 .45 
3 10.4   6.1 14.7   .33 .56 
4 36.6 28.8 44.1 6.39 .01 
5   9.0   3.0 14.7   .16 .69 
6   6.0   6.1   5.9   .13 .72 
7   5.2 10.6   0   
Missing   4.5   6.1   2.9   
General Cancer -      
1 3.0   6.1   0   
2 11.2   7.6 14.7   .42 .52 
3 6.7   3.0 10.3   .11 .74 
4 31.3 22.7 39.7 4.26 .04 
5 15.7 10.6 20.6   .86 .35 
6 11.2 12.1 10.3   .47 .49 
7 15.7 28.8   2.9   .16 .74 
Missing 5.2   9.1   1.5   
   Table continues on next page
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Table 11 continued 
Non-cancer +      
1 10.4 18.2   2.9   .20 .65 
2   9.7 13.6   5.9   .30 .58 
3 11.9   3.0 20.6   .24 .63 
4 28.4 27.3 29.4 3.68 .06 
5 13.4   9.1 17.6   .62 .43 
6   9.0   1.5 16.2   .09 .76 
7 11.2 19.7   2.9   .22 .64 
Missing   6.0   7.6   4.4   
Non-cancer -      
1   4.5   9.1   0   
2   6.0   4.5   7.4   .12 .73 
3   9.7   4.5 14.7   .25 .62 
4 31.3 28.8 33.8 4.59 .03 
5 14.2   6.1 22.1   .52 .47 
6 13.4 12.1 14.7   .69 .41 
7 17.9 31.8   4.4   .57 .45 
Missing   3.0   3.0   2.9   
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Age x Frame 
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Appendix A: Decision-making Questionnaire 
Please think about the following situation. 
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer.  Otherwise, you are in an excellent 
state of health.  It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with this type of breast cancer 
this year.  There are two experimental treatment programs that involve equal amounts of both 
drug therapy and radiation.  Your physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for 
each treatment program.    
 
Please list all of the different ways that you would deal with the situation. That is, write as 
many different solutions as you can think of.  Please put each solution on a different line.  
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Would you want to talk to someone about the situation? (circle one)        Yes                    No 
 
 If yes, who would you talk to? Please list your relationship with this person.  For 
example:  friend, spouse, etc.  List all of the people you would talk to.  Please put each on a 
separate line. 
 
___________________________________      _____________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
 
___________________________________     ______________________________________ 
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Please think about the situation again.  
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer.  Otherwise, you are in an excellent 
state of health.  It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with this type of breast cancer 
this year.  There are two experimental treatment programs that involve equal amounts of both 
drug therapy and radiation.  Your physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for 
each treatment program.    
          
A) In treatment program A, 200 women will be cured.  
 
B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 women will be cured and a 2/3 
chance that no women will be cured.   
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Please think about the situation again.  
You have been diagnosed with a rare form breast cancer.  Otherwise, you are in an excellent 
state of health.  It is expected that 600 women will be diagnosed with this type of breast cancer 
this year.  There are two experimental treatment programs that involve equal amounts of both 
drug therapy and radiation.  Your physician describes the calculated odds of being cured for 
each treatment program.    
 
A) In treatment program A, 400 women will die.  
 
B) In treatment program B, there is a 1/3 chance that no women will die, and a 2/3 
chance that 600 women will die.  
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Please think about the following situation. 
The National Institute for Cancer has two possible treatments for cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. 
There are adequate resources to implement only 1 treatment program.   
 
 A. If treatment 1 is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 200 will be cured. 
 
           B. If treatment 2 is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 
chance that no people will be cured. 
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Please think about the following situation. 
A ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean.  There are 600 
people on the ship.  Their lives are in danger.  Two options are proposed.  Assume that the exact 
estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows: 
 A.  If option A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
          B.   If option B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 
chance that none will be saved. 
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Please think about the following situation. 
The National Institute for Cancer has two possible treatments for cancer, which could 
become standard treatments across the country. 
There are adequate resources to implement only 1 treatment program.   
 
 A. If treatment 1 is adopted, of every 600 people who get cancer 400 will die. 
 
           B. If treatment 2 is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die and a 2/3 chance 
that 600 people will die. 
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Please think about the following situation. 
A ship hits a sunken barge and is sinking in the middle of the ocean.  There are 600 
people on the ship.  Their lives are in danger.  Two options for saving the passengers are 
proposed.  Assume that the exact estimates of the consequences of the options are as follows: 
A.  In option A, 400 people will die.  
B.  In option B, there is a 1/3 chance that no people will die, and a 2/3 chance that 600 
people will die.  
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Information about you 
 
1. Sex (circle one)             Male           Female 
 
2. Age     __________ years      Date of Birth: ______________ 
 
3. Race   
African American __________ 
   Asian   __________ 
Caucasian  __________ 
Hispanic  __________ 
   Other   __________ Specify  __________ 
 
4. Highest Education 
High school   __________ 
   Some college  __________ 
   4-year college degree __________ 
   Graduate degree __________ 
    




State  ______________________________ 
 
    6. Your current yearly income   
   Less than $10,000 __________ 
   $10,001 - $20,000 __________ 
   $20,001 - $30,000 __________ 
   $30,001 - $40,000 __________ 
   $40,001 - $50,000 __________ 
   $50,001 - $60,000 __________ 
   More than $60,000 __________ 
 
    7. Number of children (living or deceased) __________ 
 
    8.  Religious affiliation 
Jewish  _________ 
Protestant  __________  
Roman Catholic __________ 
Other   __________ (specify _________________________) 
None                      __________ 
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9. What is your marital status, are you: 
1.) Married (indicate number of years married________) 
2.) Not married, but living together as married (indicate number of years______) 
3.) Widowed (indicate number of years married_________and number of years 
widowed_______) 
4.) Divorced  (indicate number of years married_________ and number of years 
divorced______) 
5.) Never married 
6.) Other 
 
10.  Do you currently live: 
a. alone 
b. with a spouse 
c. with a friend/not related 
d. with relatives (specify relationship_________________) 
e. with others (specific relationship__________________) 
 
11.  What kind of work have you done most of your life?_______________ 
 
For what kind of business, company or agency is that? _____________ 
 
12.  What is your current work status?  Are you: 
a. Employed full time 




f. Other (specify________________)       
 
     13.  How long have you been a patient of your family physician? 
Years      _______ 
Months  _______ 
 
    14.  What is the gender of your physician? (circle one)   Male     Female 
 
15.   How comfortable are you speaking to your physician about your health? (circle one) 
 
1 
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16.   How comfortable would you feel asking for a 2nd opinion? 
 
1 













 17.  Think about the past year, how many times did you go to your doctor? 
 




18.  Health Insurance Information 
 
 Do you have health  
insurance? 
Yes No 
If yes, is your health care 
provided by private 
insurance? 
Yes No 
Is your health insurance 
related to a current or 
former employer? 
Yes No 
Do you receive benefits 
from Medicare? 
Yes No 
Do you receive benefits 
from Medicaid? 
Yes No 
Do you have prescription 
drug benefits? 
Yes No 




      
   19.  How much choice do you have in choosing a physician? 
 
1 







Mostly Up To 
Me 
5 
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21. Please list all health-related conditions from which you currently suffer. 
 
____________________________   __________________________________ 
____________________________   __________________________________ 
____________________________   __________________________________ 
____________________________   __________________________________ 
____________________________   __________________________________ 
 
   
22.          About how many days have you spent in the hospital in the past 12 months? 
  
________ Number of days 
 
 
23. About how many days during the past twelve months have you been sick in bed all 
or most of the day? 
 
   _________ Number of days 
 
24.           Are you currently taking any prescription drugs?          Yes          No 
 





    25.   Are you currently taking any over the counter drugs?          Yes          No 
 








      26.   Do you smoke cigarettes or cigars?  (circle one)          Yes          No 
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27.  Personal experience with breast cancer 
                      
 
Have you ever been 
diagnosed with breast 










If yes, what month and year 










What treatment did you 
















Is the cancer cured or in 
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28. Personal experience with cancer 
 
 
Have you ever been 
diagnosed with another 
















   
 









What treatment did you 

















Is the cancer cured or in 
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29. Family member/friend experience with breast cancer 
 
 
Do you any close friends or 
family members who have 
been diagnosed with breast 












   
 
What is your relationship 






   
 

















When was this person 
diagnosed with breast 


















How involved were you in 

















Is the cancer cured or in 








   
 
 
 
